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RANDOM SUSPICIONLESS DRUG TESTING:
ARE STUDENTS NO LONGER AFFORDED FOURTH
AMENDMENT PROTECTIONS?
“As nightfall does not come at once, neither does oppres-
sion.  In both instances, there is a twilight when every-
thing remains seemingly unchanged.  And it is in such
twilight that we all must be most aware of change in the
air—however slight—lest we become unwitting victims of
the darkness.”1
I. INTRODUCTION
It was a typical day at Haines City High School in Polk County,
Flordia.  Like over 13 million2 students who attend public school
throughout the United States, the students shuffled through the
school house gates with excitement.  Their excitement soon turned to
confusion when upon entering the building, each student was given a
card with his or her name printed on it and instructions to proceed to
the school auditorium.  It became evident that today was far from a
typical day for the students in Haines City.  In the auditorium, the prin-
cipal instructed every student that they had to submit to a mandatory
drug testing program to detect the presence of illegal drugs.  He con-
tinued to explain that the school’s program requires each student to
urinate in a cup, to produce a sample while a teacher looks on to verify
the sample’s accuracy.  Furthermore, any student who refuses to be
tested faces immediate suspension from school and all extracurricular
activities.  Prior to enacting the program, school officials had evidence
that certain students used illegal drugs.  However, school officials and
teachers never suspected that the entire student body was using drugs.
Nevertheless, the new program requires the entire student body to
provide a urine sample and to comply fully with the program.
1. Letter from William O. Douglas to Young Lawyers Section of the Wash. State
Bar Ass’n (Sept. 10, 1976), in THE DOUGLAS LETTERS 162 (Melvin Urofsky ed. 1987).
2. The projected number of students attending public high schools in 2001 is
13,626,000. See U.S. Department of Education, National Center for Education Statistics,
Projections of Education Statistics to 2011, (This table was prepared June 2000), availa-
ble at http://nces.ed.gov/pubs2001/proj01/tables/table08_1.asp (last visited Oct. 20,
2001).
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This Note surveys cases that assess the constitutionality of student
drug testing programs and argues that the doctrinal policies surround-
ing these programs are a perversion of students’ Fourth Amendment
rights.  Part II provides a general background on Fourth Amendment
principles.  It traces the development of the “special needs” exception
to the warrant and probable cause requirement used to sanction drug
testing programs.  Part III addresses the Fourth Amendment’s applica-
tion to students.  In particular, this section examines the narrower is-
sue of “suspicionless” drug testing of students who participate in,
athletics, extracurricular activities, and certain academic courses.  Part
IV advocates that a more protective view of students’ rights should be
taken when random suspicionless drug tests are applied to students.
This Part argues that current drug testing programs fail on the doctri-
nal underpinnings of the “special needs” exception to the warrant and
reasonableness requirements of the Fourth Amendment.  This Part ex-
amines Supreme Court case law where students were held to have a
lower expectation of privacy than adults with respect to searches and
seizures at school.  This case law however was based on a form of indi-
vidualized suspicion and used the reasonableness interpretation of the
Fourth Amendment to sanction the search.  In addition, this part ex-
amines Supreme Court cases that have found constitutional suspi-
cionless drug testing regimes in limited circumstances where the
government had either a demonstrated drug problem with regard to
the group tested or a unique governmental concern that necessitated a
relaxation of the Fourth Amendment.  This Note argues that the com-
bined progression of these cases including the Supreme Court’s recent
decision in Board of Education v. Earls, which upheld the suspicionless
drug testing of students in certain extracurricular activities, represents
a troubling expansion of drug testing, which moves in the direction of
school-wide drug testing of all students in pubic schools.  Furthermore,
this Note argues that school-wide drug testing is undesirable because
students, as citizens of the United States, are entitled to Fourth
Amendment protections.
II. BACKGROUND ON FOURTH AMENDMENT
A. Basic Fourth Amendment Principles
The Fourth Amendment provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches
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and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrant shall
issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or af-
firmation, and particularly describing the place to be
searched, and the persons or things to be seized.3
Composed of a mere 54 words, this provision has historical roots in
American, as well as English jurisprudence.4  The Fourth Amendment
was ratified on December 14, 1791 and is part of the Bill of Rights.
Originally, the restrictions against unreasonable searches and seizures
were considered inapplicable to the states.5  The Supreme Court,
through much controversy, concluded that the guarantees of the Bill
of Rights applies to the states in exactly the same manner as they apply
to the federal government.6
The structure of the Fourth Amendment is such that it can be
divided into two parts; the “reasonableness clause” and the “warrant
clause.”7  The relationship between these clauses has fostered consider-
3. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
4. See J. LANDYNSKI, SEARCH AND SEIZURE AND THE SUPREME COURT ch. 1 (1966).
Noting that the Fourth Amendment is “alone among those constitutional provisions
which sets standards of fair conduct for the apprehension and trial of accused per-
sons. . .it is the one procedural safeguard in the Constitution that grew directly out of
the events which immediately preceded the revolutionary struggle with England.” See
also N. LASSON, THE HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT TO THE
UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION (1937).
5. See Barron v. Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243 (1833), where the Supreme Court
held that the rights guaranteed in the first eight amendments do not apply to the states.
See also The Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873), holding that the first
eight amendments are not “privileges or immunities” and therefore not applicable to
the states via the Fourteenth Amendment.  The Fourteenth Amendment, adopted in
1868, provides that “No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any
person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”  U.S. CONST. amend. XIV § 1.
Since its adoption, the Fourteenth Amendment has been the subject of considerable
debate, commonly called the “incorporation” debate, on the extent that the Fourteenth
Amendment “incorporates” the restrictions of the Bill of Rights so as to make them
applicable to the states. See generally Akhil Reed Amar, The Bill of Rights and the Fourteenth
Amendment, 101 YALE L.J. 1193 (1992); Richard L. Aynes, Charles Fairman, Felix Frank-
furter, and the Fourteenth Amendment, 70 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1197 (1995); Robert L. Cord,
The Incorporation Doctrine and Procedural Due Process Under the Fourteenth Amendment: An
Overview, 1987 B.Y.U. L. REV. 867; Charles Fairman, Does the Fourteenth Amendment Incor-
porate the Bill of Rights? The Original Understanding, 2 STAN. L. REV. 5 (1949).
6. See Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 US 643, 655
(1961).
7. The reasonableness clause is phrased in general terms: “The right of the peo-
ple to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable
searches and seizures shall not be violated. . . .” The warrant clause provides that “no
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able debate among scholars.8  One school of thought advocates a “war-
rant preference” rule which provides that any search or seizure that is
not accompanied by a warrant is presumably unreasonable.9  Another
school of thought advocates a “reasonableness” rule which only re-
quires the balance of an individual’s privacy interests against that of
the government.10 Irrespective of which approach is taken, “individual-
ized suspicion” is generally required by the Fourth Amendment.11  In-
dividualized suspicion, which can include probable cause or
reasonable suspicion, is the justification necessary for a Fourth Amend-
ment search.12
The Supreme Court has defined probable cause as “a fair
probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a
particular place.”13  Reasonable suspicion, however, requires less justi-
fication than probable cause, and sanctions an intrusion where “spe-
cific and articulable facts which, taken together with rational
Warrant shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and
particularly describing the place or thing to be searched, and the persons or things to
be seized.” U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
8. See Akhil Reed Amar, Fourth Amendment First Principles, 107 HARV. L. REV. 757,
761-85 (1994); Carol S. Steiker, Second Thoughts About First Principles, 107 HARV. L. REV.
820, 855-56 (1994); Carig Bradley, Two Models of the Fourth Amendment, 83 MICH. L. REV.
1468, 1468-69 (1985); Scott E. Sundby, A Return to Fourth Amendment Basics: Undoing the
Mischief of Camara and Terry, 72 MINN. L. REV. 383, 383-84 (1988); Nadine Strossen, The
Fourth Amendment in the Balance: Accurately Setting the Scales Through the Least Intrusive
Alternative Analysis, 63 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1173, 1178-84 (1988).
9. See United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984).  A search warrant “provides the
detached scrutiny of a neutral magistrate, which is a more reliable safeguard against
improper searches than the hurried judgment of a law enforcement officer ‘engaged in
the often competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime,’”. . .we have expressed a strong
preference for warrants and declared that “in a doubtful or marginal case a search
under a warrant may be sustainable where without one it would fail.” Id. at 914.
10. See New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325 (1985).  In T.L.O., the Court stated that
the constitutionality of a search of a student’s purse would depend “on the reasonable-
ness, under all the circumstances, of the search.” Id. at 341. Compare Tracey Maclin,
The Central Meaning of the Fourth Amendment, 35 WM. AND MARY L. REV. 197 (1993).  Criti-
cizing the Supreme Court for engaging in “ad-hoc reasonable standard” to uphold
searches. Id. at 205-07. See also Strossen, supra, note 8, at 1178-80.  (noting that “the
[reasonableness rule,] holds that the two clauses impose a single, unitary, and overarch-
ing standard of reasonableness under which the existence of probable cause or a war-
rant is simply a constituent factor.”).
11. United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 560 (1976) (holding that
“some quantum of individualized suspicion is usually a prerequisite to a constitutional
search or seizure.”).
12. See T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 340-42.
13. Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238 (1983).
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inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant [the] intrusion.”14
Notwithstanding the general requirement for individualized suspicion,
the Court has on several occasions upheld searches with neither form
of suspicion.15
The warrant and reasonableness requirements checks unfettered
government intrusions into the private lives of its citizens.16  Despite
the importance of the warrant and probable cause requirements, the
Supreme Court has developed various exceptions to them.  For exam-
ple, warrants are not required when the police are in “hot pursuit” of a
suspect,17 when exigent circumstances call for immediate action to
prevent the destruction of evidence,18 during automobile searches and
seizures,19 and when evidence is in “plain view.”20  Also, neither a war-
rant nor probable cause is required for “inventory searches” of auto-
mobiles and other property impounded by the police,21 for a search
incident to lawful custodial arrest,22 and “administrative searches,” in-
cluding inspections of certain closely regulated businesses23 and drug
testing of certain government employees.24  In addition, the Supreme
Court has required that brief investigative detentions,25 searches of
government employees’ desks,26 and public school searches of stu-
14. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21 (1968).
15. See, e.g., Michigan Dept. of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444 (1990) (sobriety
checkpoint aimed at removing drunk driving); Vernonia v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646 (1995)
(drug testing of student athletes not based on individualized suspicion); Camara, 387
U.S. 523 (routine inspections by city housing authority not based on individualized sus-
picion); Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543 (border checkpoint stops not based on individual-
ized suspicion); Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602 (1989) (drug
testing of railroad employees not based on individualized suspicion); National Treasury
Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656 (1989) (drug testing of U.S. Customs offi-
cials not based on individualized suspicion).
16. Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 528 (1967) (noting that the “[t]he
basic purpose of the [Fourth Amendment] is to safeguard the privacy and security of
individuals against arbitrary invasions by government officials). See also LASSON, supra
note 4, at 79-82.
17. Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 310 (1967).
18. Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740 (1984).
19. California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386 (1985).
20. Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321 (1987).
21. Illinois v. Lafayette, 462 U.S. 640 (1983); South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S.
364 (1976).
22. Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 763 (1969).
23. New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691 (1987) (automobile junkyard inspections);
Donovan v. Dewey, 452 U.S. 594 (1981) (mine safety inspections); United States v. Bis-
well, 406 U.S. 311 (1972) (gun dealer inspections).
24. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656 (1989); Skinner, 489 U.S. 602 (1989).
25. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 16-20 (1968).
26. O’Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709 (1987).
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dents and their possessions27 be supported by reasonable suspicion
and not probable cause.
B. The Development of the “Special Needs” Doctrine
As noted above, the Supreme Court has allowed exceptions to the
restrictions of the Fourth Amendment for certain “administrative
searches.”  The “special needs” exception is a significant subset of the
“administrative search” exception, where the warrant and/or probable
cause requirements are impracticable and beyond the need of normal
law enforcement.28  Contemporary “special needs” analysis developed
with Camara v. Municipal Court,29 where the Court began to examine
the Fourth Amendment issues surrounding searches initiated for non-
criminal and public purposes.
In Camara, the Supreme Court reviewed the constitutionality of a
state housing inspection scheme that allowed inspectors to search
homes for housing code violations at any time.30  The search was
neither supported by probable cause nor accompanied by a warrant.31
The Court noted that in certain cases requiring probable cause would
unduly “frustrate the governmental purpose” of discovering safety vio-
lations.32  The Court concluded that it would be unreasonable to re-
quire probable cause as it is required in the criminal context.33
Accordingly, the Court found that probable cause in the administrative
inspections required a lesser showing than that normally required for a
criminal warrant.34  The Court balanced “the [government’s] need to
search against the invasion which the search entails.”35  The analysis
27. New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325 (1985).  The Supreme Court has shifted its
focus from reasonable suspicion in the public school context to a “suspicionless” stan-
dard.  See infra Part IV, which focuses on this doctrinal shift for assessing the constitu-
tionality of school searches and explores the perverted effects of school wide testing
that have resulted from discursive standards.
28. Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 881 (1987) (quoting T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 351
(1985) (Blackmun, J., concurring in judgment)).
29. 387 U.S. 523 (1967).
30. See id. at 526-27.
31. See id.
32. See id. at 533.
33. See id. at 538.
34. See id. at 538-39.
35. Id. at 538.
\\server05\productn\N\NLR\46-3-4\NLR428.txt unknown Seq: 7 20-FEB-03 14:19
2002-2003] RANDOM SUSPICIONLESS DRUG TESTING 827
was later expanded to include the balancing of an individual’s privacy
interest against the governmental interests.36
In United States v. Martinez-Fuerte,37 the Supreme Court upheld a
brief detention, without individualized suspicion, of vehicle occupants
at fixed checkpoints near the Mexican border. The majority opinion,
citing Camara, employed a balancing test and found that the govern-
ment’s need to prevent illegal immigration, by controlling the border,
outweighed the individual’s interest in not being detained.38  The
Court held that “[A] requirement that stops on major routes inland
always be based on reasonable suspicion would be impractical because
the flow of traffic tends to be too heavy to allow the particularized
study of a given car that would enable it to be identified as a possible
carrier of illegal aliens.”39  Interestingly, Martinez-Fuerte marks a shift in
the constitutional analysis because individualized suspicion, as well as
the warrant requirement, was considered unnecessary for a “reasona-
bleness” determination.40
In 1989, the Supreme Court in Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives’
Ass’n41 and National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab42 began its
current “special needs” jurisprudence by upholding the constitutional-
ity of warrantless blood43 and urine testing.44  In Skinner, the Federal
36. See Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648 (1979).  In Prouse, a Delaware police of-
ficer pulled over a driver and checked his license and registration without suspicion of
any wrongdoing. See id. at 650.  During the search, the officer “smelled marijuana
smoke” and saw contraband items in plain view and therefore arrested the driver. See
id. at 650.  The Court examined the nature of the intrusion involved in the search, and
questioned the efficacy of the random search in achieving the desired goal. See id. at
659.  The Court stated that the “incremental contribution to highway safety” achieved
through random spot checks did not justify the “physical and psychological” intrusions
upon the person being searched. See id. at 657-59. But see Michigan Dept. of State
Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444 (1990).  Where the court upheld a brief suspicionless
seizures at highway checkpoints for the purpose of combating drunk driving. Id.
37. 428 U.S. 543 (1976).
38. See id. at 554.
39. Id. at 557.
40. Id. at 567-68 (Brennan, J., dissenting).  Both Justice Brennan and Marshall in
dissent recognized the effect of the decision as “consistent with [the majority’s] pur-
pose to debilitate Fourth Amendment protections.” Id. at 568.  Justice Brennan noted
that the decision “virtually emptie[d] the Amendment of its reasonableness require-
ment.” Id. at 567.
41. 489 U.S. 602 (1989).
42. 489 U.S. 656 (1989).
43. See Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966).  In Schmerber, a physician, at
the direction of a police officer, extracted blood from a suspect to test for alcohol con-
tent. Id. at 758.  Although the Court found that there was probable cause for the defen-
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Railroad Administration (FRA) instituted a standardized drug testing
policy.45  Under the policy, the FRA required mandatory blood and
urine tests for employees involved in train accidents.46  The FRA found
that from 1972 to 1983 “‘the nation’s railroad experienced at least 21
significant train accidents involving alcohol or drug use as a probable
cause or contributing factor,’ and that these accidents ‘resulted in 25
fatalities, 61 non-fatal injuries, and property damage estimated at $19
million (approximately $27 million in 1982 dollars).’”47  The Court,
utilizing the reasonableness test, held that the governmental interest in
the safety of the railway industry and its passengers and employees was
sufficiently compelling to justify an intrusion of privacy via drug tests
without individualized suspicion.48  A significant part of the majority’s
reasoning was the Court’s proclamation that railroad employees, be-
cause they work in an industry that was highly regulated to ensure
safety, have a “diminished expectation of privacy” with respect to their
dant’s arrest, there was no warrant for the search and seizure of bodily fluids. See id. at
768.  Nonetheless, the Court held that search and seizure was justified in light of the
fact that the alcohol in the defendant’s bloodstream would have been “destroyed” had
they waited to obtain a warrant. Id. at 769-70.  This is considered an “exigent circum-
stance,” which is an accepted exception to the warrant requirement. See JOSHUA
DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL PROCEDURE §§ 12.01-02 (2d ed.  1997). See also
Michael G. Rogers, Bodily Intrusions in Search of Evidence: A Study in Fourth Amendment
Decisionmaking, 62 IND. L.J. 1181 (1987).
44. The Skinner decision is significant because it is the first recognition of urine
testing as a search under the Fourth Amendment.  The Court explains, “It is not dis-
puted. . .that chemical analysis of urine, like that of blood, can reveal a host of private
of private medical facts about an employee, including whether she is epileptic, preg-
nant, or diabetic.  Nor can it be disputed that the process of collecting the sample to be
tested, which may in some cases involve visual or aural monitoring of the act of urina-
tion, itself implicates privacy interests.  Because it is clear that the collection and testing
of urine intrudes upon expectations of privacy that society has long recognized as rea-
sonable, the Federal Courts of Appeals have concluded unanimously, and we agree,
that these intrusions must be deemed searches under the Fourth Amendment.”  Skin-
ner v. Railway Labor Executives Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 617 (1989).
45. See id. at 606.  The Federal Railroad Safety Act of 1973 gave the Secretary of
Transportation authority to promulgate regulations prohibiting drug use among rail-
road workers. See id.  The Association of American Railroads instituted industry-wide
rules for railroad employees who possessed or used certain drugs. See id.  To no avail,
many violations were undetected, which resulted in the federal government’s adoption
of the mandatory drug-testing scheme in the case. See id. at 608-11.
46. Id. at 606.
47. Id. at 607.
48. The Court reasoned that “even a momentary lapse of attention” could result
in disaster. Id. at 628.
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physical condition.49  Therefore, the Skinner decision represents a nar-
row exception to the warrant and reasonable requirements, where a
suspicionless test was upheld “to prevent accidents and casualties in
railroad operations that result from [demonstrated] impairment of
employees by alcohol or drugs.”50
In Von Raab, the United States Customs Service required urine
tests for its employees that sought promotion or transfer to positions
involving drug interdiction, the carrying of a firearm, or the handling
of classified information.51  Utilizing the reasonableness-balancing test,
the Court recognized the need of the Customs Service to deter drug
use among eligible candidates for promotion to sensitive positions and
to prevent the promotion of drug users to those positions.52  In addi-
tion, the Court disposed of the employees’ expectation of privacy be-
cause customs employees should expect that the government would
investigate their judgment, fitness and dexterity.53  Interestingly, un-
like the FRA in Skinner, the Customs Service in Von Raab did not have
documented proof of significant drug use among its employees.  Nev-
ertheless, the Court found the testing “reasonable” in light of the “ex-
traordinary safety and national security hazards” attendant with
Customs employees on illegal drugs.54  As the Court noted, “the almost
unique mission of the Service gives the Government a compelling in-
terest in ensuring that many of these covered employees do not use
drugs even off duty, for such use creates risks of bribery and blackmail
against which the Government is entitled to guard.”55
In Chandler v. Miller,56 the special needs doctrine was given some
teeth as the Supreme Court, for the first time, struck down a suspi-
cionless drug testing scheme.57 Chandler involved a Georgia statute
49. Id. at 627.
50. Id. at 621.
51. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 661.
52. Id. at 666.  In particular, the Court acknowledged the government’s concern
that customs employees who interdict drugs should be physically fit and have integrity
and judgment. See id. at 670.  The Court also noted that customs employees that carry
firearms should not have an impairment of perception and judgment as a result of drug
use. See id.
53. Id. at 672.
54. Id. at 674.
55. Id.
56. 520 U.S. 305 (1997).
57. See Robert Dodson, Ten Years of Randomized Jurisprudence: Amending the Special
Needs Doctrine, 51 S.C. L. REV. 258, 270 (2000) (noting that Justice Ginsburg’s majority
opinion “showed concern with the breadth of the special needs doctrine, and the
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that required candidates for designated state offices to certify that they
had taken a urinalysis drug test within 30 days prior to qualifying for
nomination or election and that the test results were negative results.58
Notably absent from the record was any proof that indicated that there
had been any drug problem among individual’s seeking political office
in Georgia.59  The Court first found that drug testing constituted a gov-
ernmental search and therefore implicated the Fourth Amendment.60
The Court then noted that a search, without individualized suspicion,
would be deemed unreasonable unless the “special needs” exception
was applicable.61  In striking down the statute, the Court noted that the
“proffered special need for drug testing must be substantial. . .enough
to override the individual’s. . .privacy interests.”62  The Court stated
that “[a] demonstrated problem of drug abuse, while not in all cases
necessary to the validity of a testing regime, would shore up an asser-
tion of special need for a suspicionless general search program.”63
The Court’s holding in Chandler has been characterized as an im-
portant limitation on the “special needs” doctrine because following its
reasoning, it is no longer “sufficient that the government demonstrate
some potential problem.  It must demonstrate an actual problem or, at
the very least, the likelihood that any drug use could be cata-
strophic.”64  However, the Supreme Court has held that, in the public
school context, a demonstrated drug abuse problem is not always nec-
essary to validate a drug testing program, even though some showing
of a problem would shore up the assertion of special need.65  As com-
mentators have observed, “special needs,” has never been sufficiently
Court’s analysis tried to place meaningful limits on the doctrine’s ever-widening
scope.”).
58. Chandler, 520 U.S. at 305.
59. Id. at 319.
60. Id. at 308-09.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 318.
63. See id. (citing National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab).
64. See Dodson, supra note 57, at 271.
65. See Earls, 122 S. Ct. at 2567-68.
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explained.66  Nonetheless, the term has been used to sanction signifi-
cant Fourth Amendment intrusions in the public school context.67
III. PUBLIC SCHOOLS & THE FOURTH AMENDMENT
A. The Beginning:  New Jersey v. TLO
In the last century and especially in the last forty years, the Su-
preme Court has resolved a myriad of constitutional issues that have
arisen in the context of public schools.  In New Jersey v. T.L.O.,68 the
Supreme Court, directed its attention to searches and seizures in the
public school setting.  In T.L.O., a female student was caught smoking
in a school lavatory, in violation of school rules.69  The student was
brought to the vice-principal’s office where he demanded her purse.70
The vice-principal opened the purse and saw that it contained a pack-
age of cigarettes.71  After removing the cigarettes from the student’s
bag, the principal discovered cigarette rolling paper typically used to
smoke marijuana.72  Based on the discovery, the vice-principal con-
ducted a full search of the student’s purse and found other evidence
which implicated her as a marijuana dealer.73
The Supreme Court held that the search was constitutional74 and
declared that searches by public school officials are not subject to ei-
ther the warrant or the probable cause requirements of the Fourth
66. See id. (criticizing the “special needs” cases for failing to adequately define the
doctrine). See also William Stunz, Implicit Bargains, Government Power, and the Fourth
Amendment, 44 STAN. L. REV. 553, 554 (1992) (noting that “little or no effort has been
made to explain what these ‘special needs’ are; the term turns out to be no more than a
label that indicates when a lax standard will apply.”).
67. See infra Part III (discussing suspicionless urinalysis testing of students in pub-
lic schools).
68. See New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325 (1985).
69. See id. at 328.
70. See id. at 343.
71. See id.
72. See id.
73. See id.
74. In reaching its conclusion, the Court rejected the state’s primary argument
that public school officials were outside the scope of the Fourth Amendment based on
the premise that teaches and administrators act in loco parentis as mere agents of the
parents.  The Court held that this argument was “in tension with contemporary reality,”
and inconsistent with its precedent. See id. at 336. But see R.C.M v. State, 660 S.W.2d
552, 555 (Tex App. 1983) (holding that teachers act in loco parentis and thus are not
subject to the restrictions of the Fourth Amendment); see also James Ryan, The Supreme
Court and Public Schools, 86 VA. L. REV. 1335, 1397 (2000) (arguing that over the years
the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence “suggest[s] that the Court itself might be acting in
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Amendment.75  To arrive at its decision, the Court recognized two spe-
cific school interests: the need to maintain order and the desire to
foster a proper educational environment.76  However, the Court also
found that public school students possess a privacy interest in their
possessions77 and should be free from unreasonable searches and
seizures.78  Justices Powell and O’Connor, in concurrence, noted that
“students within the school environment have a lesser expectation of
privacy than members of the population generally.”79 Accordingly, the
Court employed the “reasonableness” standard and found that the gov-
ernment’s interests outweighed the intrusion on the student’s privacy
interests.80
Interestingly, a significant aspect of T.L.O. was the Court’s modifi-
cation of the level of suspicion needed to justify the search.81  The
Court articulated that it has always endorsed the proposition that in
certain limited circumstances, a standard that stops short of probable
cause is acceptable.82  Nonetheless, it is significant to note that T.L.O.’s
analysis was based in part on the fact that individualized suspicion was
present in the case.83
loco parentis, enforcing those policies that most parents would support and question-
ing those policies that . . .parents would oppose.”).
75. See T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 340-41.  The Court emphasized that the warrant re-
quirement was particularly “unsuited to the school environment” since requiring a war-
rant would “unduly interfere with the maintenance of swift and informal disciplinary
procedures needed in the schools.” Id. at 340.
76. See id. at 339.
77. The Court defined personal possessions as those related to legitimate scholas-
tic or extracurricular activities. See id. at 338-39.
78. See id. at 339.
79. Id. at 348. (Powell, J., concurring) (“It is simply unrealistic to think that stu-
dents have the same subjective expectation of privacy as the population generally.
But. . .children in school—no less than adults—have privacy interests that society is
prepared to recognize as legitimate.”).
80. See id. at 337.  The majority articulated that “[w]here a careful balancing of
governmental and private interests suggests that the public interest is best served by a
Fourth Amendment standard of reasonableness that stops short of probable cause, we
have not hesitated to adopt such a standard.” Id. at 341.  Justice Brennan and Marshall
emphatically disagreed with the majority, noting that The Court’s decision “jettisons
the probable-cause standard—the only standard that finds support in the text of the
Fourth Amendment” and replaced it with a “Rohrschach [sic]-like ‘balancing test.” See
id. at 357-58.
81. See id. at 340.
82. See id. at 341.
83. See infra Part IV notes 162 -67 and accompanying text (discussing of how indi-
vidualized suspicion is no longer present in urinalysis searches of students).
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B. Vernonia v. Acton
In Vernonia v. Acton,84 the Vernonia school district, in response to
a perceived drug problem,85 implemented a drug-testing program.86
Under this program, all students who participated in the school dis-
trict’s athletic programs had to subject themselves to random drug test-
ing.87  As such, the students and their parents had to sign consent
forms, which authorized the school district to perform the drug test
through a urine sample.88  The Supreme Court held that the school
district’s drug program was reasonable and thus did not contravene
the Fourth Amendment.89  Justice Scalia, writing for the majority, con-
cluded that the warrant and probable cause requirements were imprac-
ticable due to the “‘special needs’ [which] exist in the public school
context.”90
The Court considered several factors in applying the reasonable-
ness-balancing test.  First, the Court examined the nature of the pri-
vacy interest intruded upon.91  In doing so, the Court considered the
fact that the subjects of the program are “(1) children, who (2) have
been committed to the temporary custody of the State as school-
84. 515 U.S. 646 (1995).
85. As the District Court stated:
The administration was at its wits end and . . .a large segment of the student
body, particularly those involved in interscholastic athletics, was in a state of
rebellion.  Disciplinary actions had reached ‘epidemic proportions.’  The
coincidence of an almost three-fold increase in classroom disruptions and
disciplinary reports along with the staff’s direct observations of students us-
ing drugs or glamorizing drug and alcohol use led the administration to the
inescapable conclusion that the rebellion was being fueled by alcohol and
drug abuse as well as the student’s misperceptions about the drug culture.
Id. at 649.
86. See id. at 650.
87. See id.
88. The urine sample is collected by the student who is enters an empty locker
room with an adult monitor of the same sex.  The student selected “produces a sample
at a urinal, remaining fully clothed with his back to the monitor, who stands approxi-
mately 12 to 15 feet behind the student.  Monitors may . . .watch the student while he
produces the sample, and. . .they listen for normal sounds of urination. . .. After the
sample is produced, it is given to the monitor, who checks it for temperature and tam-
pering. . . .” Id.
89. See id. at 664-65.
90. See id. at 653.  This phrase has sparked much debate because it is unclear
whether special needs are always present in the public school context or some determi-
nation has to be made to invoke the exception. See discussion infra notes 165-66 and
accompanying text.
91. See Acton, 515 U.S. at 654.
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master.”92  Consequently, the Court concluded that students in the
school environment are afforded a lesser expectation of privacy than
the population generally.93  The Court noted that this was evidenced
by the fact that students routinely submit to physical examinations and
vaccinations against disease.94  In addition, the Court found that the
legitimate expectation of privacy is even less for student athletes due to
the “communal undress” inherent in athletic participation.95  Moreo-
ver, the Court noted that student athletes, by choosing to “go out for
the team,” voluntarily submit to a higher degree of regulation than the
general population of students.96
The Court then turned to the character of the intrusion.97  The
Court found the intrusion “negligible” in light of the fact that the
urinalysis procedure was nearly identical to use of a public restroom.98
Finally, the Court analyzed the nature and immediacy of the govern-
ment’s concern to determine whether there was a compelling interest
that was reasonably related to addressing the harm.99  The Court con-
cluded that the school district had a “perhaps compelling” interest in
deterring drug use among school children.100  In doing so, the Court
recognized that the school district had an enhanced interest in
preventing drug use among athletes due to “the risk of immediate
physical harm to the drug user or those with whom he is playing his
sport.”101  Moreover, the Court rejected the notion of a suspicion
based testing scheme because schoolteachers, who would likely imple-
ment such a program, would be “ill prepared” for the tasks of de-
92. See id.
93. The Court explains that the “power” that private schools have is “custodial and
tutelary, permitting a degree of supervision and control that could not be exercised
over free adults.” Id. at 655.
94. See id. at 656.
95. The Court observes that “[s]chool sports are not for the bashful.  They require
‘suiting up’ before each practice or event, and showering and changing after-
wards. . .[n]o individual dressing rooms are provided; shower heads are lined up along
a wall, unseparated by any sort of partition. . .[and] toilet stalls [do not] have doors.”
Id. at 657.
96. See id.  The Court analogizes the voluntary submission in the athletic context
with the adults who choose to participate in a “closely regulated industry” like Skinner.
See id.; see also supra n. 41-50 (discussing Skinner).
97. See Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 658.
98. See id. at 659.
99. See id. at 662.
100. See id. at 661.
101. See id. at 662.
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tecting signs of drug use.102  Balancing the student’s diminished
expectation of privacy against the severity of the government’s interest
and the unintrusive nature of the search, the Court found the drug
testing scheme “reasonable” under the Fourth Amendment.103
Justice Ginsburg wrote a separate concurring opinion where she
observed that the Vernonia decision, as she understood it, applied only
to students who voluntarily participate in athletics.104  She expressly
reserved the question of suspicionless drug testing to other segments
of the student population for another day.105  Nevertheless, scholars
and various courts across the country have amorphously extended
Vernonia’s reach to drug test students outside the athletic context.106
Justice O’Connor along with Justices Stevens and Souter dissented
from the Vernonia holding.  In her dissent, O’Connor observed that
the majority decision disregarded “history and precedent” that estab-
lished individualized suspicion as “usually required” under the Fourth
Amendment except in cases where a suspicion-based scheme would be
likely ineffectual.107  According to O’Connor:
The great irony of this case is that most (though not all)
of the evidence the District introduced to justify its suspi-
cionless drug testing program consisted of first- or sec-
102. See id. at 664.  In dissent, Justice O’Connor criticizes the majority for dispens-
ing with a suspicion-based approach on considered policy grounds. See id. at 667
(O’Connor, J., dissenting).  She articulates that historically, “mass suspicionless
searches have been generally considered per se unreasonable within the meaning of
the Fourth Amendment.” See id. (emphasis in original). See also Jennifer L. Malin,
Comment, Vernonia School District 47J v. Acton: A Further Erosion of the Fourth Amendment,
62 BROOK. L. REV. 469 (1996) (arguing that the special nature of the school environ-
ment is particularly suited to a requirement of individualized suspicion).
103. See id. at 664-65.
104. See id. at 666 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
105. See id.
106. See Joanna Raby, Note, Reclaiming Our Public Schools: A Proposal for School-wide
Drug Testing, 21 CARDOZO L. REV. 999 (1999); George M. Dery, III, Are Politicians More
Deserving of Privacy than Schoolchildren?  How Chandler v. Miller Exposed the Absurdities of
Fourth Amendment “Special Needs” Balancing, 40 ARIZ. L. REV. 73, 74 (1998); Darrel Jack-
son, Note & Comment, The Constitution Expelled: What Remains of Students’ Fourth Amend-
ment Rights?, 28 Ariz. St. L.J. 673 (1996); Darren K. Sharp, Note, Drug Testing and the
Fourth Amendment:  What Happened to Individualized Suspicion?, 46 DRAKE L. REV. 149, 152-
55 (1997); Irene Merker Rosenberg, Public School Drug Testing: The Impact of Acton, 33
AM. CRIM. L. REV. 349, 360 (1996) (“A majority of the Court seems to have understood
that the majority opinion has or may have a far broader sweep than that suggested by
Justice Ginsburg.”).
107. See Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 676 (O’Connor, J., dissenting).
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ond-hand stories of particular, identifiable students acting
in ways that plainly gave rise to reasonable suspicion of in-
school drug use—and thus would have justified a drug-
related search under our T.L.O. decision.108
Accordingly, O’Connor argued that in these circumstances, a suspi-
cionless search regime was categorically unreasonable.109  Since
Vernonia, numerous lower courts have addressed the issue of extending
random drug testing to students who participate in extracurricular ac-
tivities and certain academic courses.110  Some have ignored the
Vernonia factors and concluded that extracurricular activity is as com-
pelling as athletic participation.111  Others have extended Vernonia on
the basis of the school district’s “substantial” need to prevent the possi-
ble harm of drug use.112  While others have rejected the extension of
random drug tests to extracurricular activities.113
C. Board of Education v. Earls
Contributing to the post-Vernonia melee, the Supreme Court in
Board of Education v. Earls114 found constitutional a school district’s at-
tempt to randomly drug test its students who participated in extracur-
ricular activities.  The school district did not have individualized
suspicion or proof of a demonstrated drug problem.  The case arose
out of the Tecumseh School District in Oklahoma and involved a pol-
icy that tested all students “in any extracurricular activity” such as the
108. See id. at 679  (O’Connor, J., dissenting).
109. See id. at 680 (O’Connor J., dissenting).
110. See Earls v. Bd. of Educ. of Tecumseh Public School Dist., 242 F.3d 1264 (10th
Cir.  2001), overruled by 122 S. Ct. 2559 (2002); Joy v. Penn-Harris Madison School
Corp., 212  F.3d 1052 (7th Cir.  2000); Willis v. Anderson Community School Corp., 158
F.3d 415 (7th Cir. 1998); Todd v. Rush County Schools, 133 F. 3d 984 (7th Cir. 1998);
Miller v. Wilkes, 172 F.3d 574 (8th Cir. 1999); Tannahill v. Lockney Independent
School Dist., 133 F.Supp.2d 919 (N.D. Tx  2001); Trinidad School District No. 1 v. Lo-
pez, 963 P.2d 1095 (Colo. 1998); Theodore v. Delaware Valley School Dist., 761 A.2d
652 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2000); Linke v. Northwestern School Corp., 763 N.E.2d 972 (Ind.
Ct. App. 2002).
111. See Todd, 133 F.3d at 986; Joy, 212 F.3d at 1065; see also Jennifer E. Smiley,
Rethinking the “Special Needs” Doctrine: Suspicionless Drug Testing of High School Students and
the Narrowing of Fourth Amendment Protections, 95 NW. U. L. REV. 811, 829 (2001) (noting
the “brevity and lack of analysis” in the Todd decision).
112. See Miller, 172 F.3d at 581.
113. See Earls, 242 F.3d at 1278; Trinidad, 963 P.2d at 1109; Theodore, 761 A.2d at
660-61; Tannahill, 133 F.Supp. at 930-31.
114. 122 S. Ct. 2559 (2002).
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Future Home Makers of America, Future Farmers of America, Aca-
demic Team, Band, and Cheerleaders.115
The District Court rejected the claim that the policy violated the
Fourth Amendment and granted summary judgment to the School
District.116  The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, holding that
the policy was unconstitutional.117  The Tenth Circuit began its analy-
sis by noting the confusion as to the application of the special needs
doctrine in light of Chandler v. Miller.118  Nonetheless, the Court noted
that Vernonia was the “primary guide” to its analysis in that it was the
only Supreme Court case that deals with the unique environment of
the school setting.119
Although the Court acknowledged that students have a somewhat
lesser expectation of privacy, the court took issue with the nature of
the governmental concerns and the efficacy of the program employed
to redress those concerns.120  While noting the importance of drug
deterrence, the Court found that testing extracurricular participants
on the grounds of “safety” is both over-inclusive and under-inclusive.121
In addition, the Court considered the “paucity of evidence of an actual
drug abuse problem” and concluded that the “immediacy” of the gov-
115. See id. at 2562-63.  The plaintiff Lindsay Earls is a member of the show choir,
the marching band, and the academic team.  The co-plaintiff, Daniel James sought to
participate in the academic team. See id. at 2563.
116. See 115 F. Supp. 2d 1281, 1287 (2000).
117. See Earls, 242 F.3d 1262.
118. The Court noted that since Chandler “a step” has been “added” to the special
needs analysis. See id. at 1269.  The Court defines the special needs inquiry as two fold:
“first, ‘whether the proffered governmental concerns were ‘real’ by asking whether the
testing program was adopted in response to a documented drug problem or whether
drug abuse among the target group would pose a serious danger to the public’; and
second, ‘whether the testing scheme met the related goals of detection and deter-
rence.’” See id. at 1268.
119. Thus, the Court found that there is a special needs in the public school con-
text, while expressly noting that the Supreme Court had not articulated that the “spe-
cial needs bar” has been raised. See id. at 1270.  In contrast, the dissent criticized the
majority for “reneg[ing]” on its holding that school districts “need not demonstrate a
special need” by “reimposing” at the end of its opinion a requirement that school dis-
tricts demonstrate an “identifiable drug problem among a sufficient number of those
subject to testing.” See id. at 1278, 1283 (Ebel, J., dissenting).
120. See id. at 1276.
121. The Court noted that some student activities subject to the testing policy “can
hardly be considered a safety risk,” while other activities that are not subject to the
policy involves a “measurable safety risk.” See id. at 1277.
\\server05\productn\N\NLR\46-3-4\NLR428.txt unknown Seq: 18 20-FEB-03 14:19
838 NEW YORK LAW SCHOOL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 46
ernment’s was greatly diminished.122  Accordingly, the Tenth Circuit
struck down the drug testing policy as unconstitutional.123
The Supreme Court, in a 5-4 decision, overruled the Tenth Circuit
and found that the School District’s drug testing policy was entirely
reasonable.124  Justice Thomas, writing for the court, noted that a find-
ing of individualized suspicion may not be necessary when a school
conducts drug testing.125  Applying the first of the Vernonia factors, the
court concluded that the students affected by the drug testing policy
have a limited expectation of privacy.126  Next, the Court examined
the character of the intrusion and found that it was virtually identical
to the “negligible” intrusion it approved in Vernonia.127  Finally, the
Court considered the nature and immediacy of the government’s con-
cerns and the efficacy of the testing policy.128  The Court held that the
health and safety risks identified in Vernonia applied in “equal force” to
the children in this case.129  Moreover, the Court stated that “a demon-
strated drug abuse problem is not always necessary to the validity of a
testing regime, even though some showing of a problem does shore up
an assertion of special need for a suspicionless general search pro-
gram.”130  The Court was satisfied that the evidence presented was suf-
ficient to “shore up” the need for the drug testing program.131
Accordingly, the court concluded that the combination of the nation
122. See id.
123. See id. at 1278.
124. See Earls, 122 S. Ct. at 2569.
125. See id. at 2565.
126. The court points out that the distinction between athletes and extracurricular
participants is “not essential” because the basis of Vernonia was the school’s custodial
responsibility and authority. See id. at 2561.  Moreover, the court notes that “students
who participate in competitive extracurricular activities voluntarily subject themselves
to many of the same intrusions on their privacy as do athletes.” Id.
127. See id. at 2566; see Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 658.
128. See Earls, 122 S. Ct. at 2567.
129. See id.  Justice O’Connor, in dissent, noted that, in this case, the drug
problems and the policies to redress them were “distinctly different” from Vernonia.
She points out that the Vernonia drug testing policy screened particular drugs that
posed substantial risks to athletes. See id. at 2576 (O’Connor, J., dissenting).
130. See id. at 2567-68.
131. The Court noted that “[t]eachers testified that they had seen students who
appeared to be under the influence of drugs and that they had heard students speaking
openly about using drugs.  A drug dog found marijuana cigarettes near the school park-
ing lot.  Police officers once found drugs or drug paraphernalia in a car driven by a
Future Farmers f America member.  And the School board president reported that peo-
ple in the community were calling the board to discuss the ‘drug situation.’”  Id. at
2567.
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wide drug epidemic and the evidence of drug use in the school district,
made the drug testing policy reasonable.132
IV. A MORE PROTECTIVE VIEW OF STUDENTS’ RIGHTS
School districts today educate America’s children on the virtues
the Constitution while simultaneously disregarding their right to be
free from unreasonable searches and seizures.  Current suspicionless
drug testing schemes demonstrate an unconstitutional perversion of
the “special needs” doctrine,133 which has lead to a complete diminu-
tion of students’ Fourth Amendment rights.  This conclusion is sup-
ported by two main arguments.  First, a “special needs” based
justification for random suspicionless drug testing fails on two doctri-
nal underpinnings of the exception.  Second, there are strong policy
reasons for students, who are obviously protected by the Constitution,
to retain some Fourth Amendment freedoms.
Commenting on the protection of students’ rights against en-
croachment by public school officials, the Supreme Court in West Vir-
ginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette observed:
The Fourteenth Amendment, as now applied to the
States, protects the citizen against the State itself and all
of its creatures—Board of Education not excepted.
These have, of course, important, delicate, and highly dis-
cretionary functions, but none that they may not perform
within the limits of the Bill of Rights.  That they are edu-
cating the young for citizenship is reason for scrupulous
protection of Constitutional freedoms of the individual, if
we are not to strangle the free mind at its source and
teach youth to discount mind at its source and teach
youth to discount important principles of our govern-
ment as mere platitudes.134
132. As a result the Court expressly rejected the Tenth Circuit’s requirement that
“some identifiable drug abuse problem” be present among the students tested. See id.
at 2568; see also Earls, 242 F.3d at 1278.  Justice Thomas noted that “[the Court] cannot
articulate a threshold level of drug use that would suffice to justify a drug testing pro-
gram for school children, we refuse to fashion what would in effect be a constitutional
quantum of drug use necessary to show a ‘drug problem.’” See Earls, 122 S. Ct. at 2568.
133. See supra notes 28-66 and accompanying text (explaining the development of
the special needs exception).
134. See New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325 (citing West Virginia State Bd. of Educ.
v.  Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 637 (1943)).
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Indeed, current school polices, under the direction of the Su-
preme Court’s decision in Vernonia, have used the “lesser expectation
of privacy” principle as a door to subject large segments of students in
public school to drug tests.135  This part argues that current drug test-
ing schemes lack the demonstrable drug problem and or the likeli-
hood that such a problem could contribute to a disaster or affect
public safety.  A reading of Skinner, Von Raab and Chandler demonstrate
that these principles are crucial to the Court’s willingness to endorse
suspicionless drug testing.  Therefore, this part advocates that, over the
years, the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence has combined and distorted
these two seemingly important principles, under the guise of special
needs, to allow schools to virtually drug test every student, thereby ex-
tinguishing their rights.136
The Supreme Court, in T.L.O., reached significant conclusions on
the issue of students’ Fourth Amendment rights in public schools.  In-
deed, the Court noted that in the school setting, there must be some
modification of the level of suspicion of illicit activity needed to justify
a search.137  Applying the reasonableness standard, the Court stated
that a search is reasonable only if (1) it was justified at its inception
and (2) if the search conducted was reasonably related in scope to the
circumstances, which justified the interference in the first place.138  In
particular, the facts in T.L.O. demonstrated that the search by the vice-
principal of a student’s purse was justified at its inception because
there was “reasonable grounds” that the student had violated school
rules.139  Thus, the balance struck by the court to sanction the search
in T.L.O. was based on individualized suspicion.140
Paradoxically, the Supreme Court later used the T.L.O reasona-
bleness analysis in Vernonia v. Acton to sanction random suspicionless
drug testing when there was clearly no form of individualized suspi-
135. See Miller v. Wilkes, 172 F.3d 574 (8th Cir. 1999).  “Our analysis in this case is
informed at the outset by the Supreme Court’s conclusion that children in the public
school setting have a lower expectation of privacy than do ordinary citizens.” Id. at 578.
In Wilkes, the court did not deem significant, the fact that in Vernonia only student
athletes were tested. Id. at 579.  Indeed, the Court took pains to point out that students
who participate in extracurricular activities also have “a legitimate expectation of pri-
vacy that is diminished to a level below [the general population of students].” See id.
136. See supra notes 41-55 and accompanying text (explaining the special needs
exception to suspicionless drug testing).
137. See T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 340.
138. See id. at 341.
139. See supra note 68 and accompanying text (noting that T.L.O had been seen in
the bathroom with cigarettes and that her accomplice had confessed to smoking).
140. See T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 342; Vernonia, 515 US at 653.
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cion.141  In Vernonia, Justice Scalia pointed out that the Court has “ex-
plicitly acknowledged. . .[that] the Fourth Amendment imposes no
irreducible requirement of. . . suspicion.”142  Nonetheless, the school
setting is distinguishable from those cases in which the Court found it
necessary to uphold the constitutionality a search with absolutely no
form of individualized suspicion.
For example, in Martinez-Fuerte, the Court held that reasonable
suspicion would be “impractical” given the heavy flow of traffic on
roads for the interdiction of illegal aliens at borders.143  Although the
Court held that individualized suspicion was not an “irreducible re-
quirement” of the Fourth Amendment, it did not imply that suspicion
was wholly dispensable.144  The circumstances in Martinez-Fuerte
presented a practical impediment to suspicion-based justification for a
search.145  Conversely, the school setting does not present such a prac-
tical impediment because the teachers and school officials, while not
law enforcement agents, interact with students on a daily basis and are
more adept at detecting the illicit activity prohibited by school policies
and the law.146  Indeed, the T.L.O. case itself is significant because it
demonstrates that a suspicion-based search is in fact practical in the
141. The Court stated that “ ‘special needs’. . .exist in the public school context.”
See Vernonia, at 653.  Next, the Court notes that the warrant requirement would unduly
impinge on teachers and administrators ability to maintain order in the schools. See id.
Then, the Court while recognizing that T.L.O. was based on individualized suspicion
disposes of the requirement. See id.
142. The Court first notes that the warrant requirement would unduly impinge on
teachers and administrators ability to maintain order in the schools. See id.  Then, the
Court, while recognizing that T.L.O. was based on individualized suspicion notes that
the court has sanction suspicionless searches in the past. See id. (citing United States v.
Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 560-61 (1976)); Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives’
Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602 (1989); National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S.
656 (1989); Michigan Dept. of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444 (1990).
143. See Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. at 557.
144. See Michael Book, Comment, Group Suspicion: The Key to Evaluating Student
Drug Testing, 48 U. KAN. L. REV. 637, 650 (2000) (arguing that the Court in Martinez-
Fuerte “held only that suspicion need not be individualized”). But see Indianapolis v.
Edmonds, 531 U.S. 32 (2000) (where Justice Thomas expressed concern that “Sitz and
Martinez-Fuerte were correctly decided.”  Justice Thomas expressed doubt that “the
Framers of the Fourth Amendment would have considered ‘reasonable’ a program of
indiscriminate stops of individuals not suspected of wrongdoing.”).
145. See Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. at 557. See also United States v. Edwards, 498 F.2d
496, 500 (1974) (Friendly, J.) (holding suspicion-based searches of airport passengers’
carry-on luggage impractical because of the great number of plane travelers and found
“inapplica[ble]” the profile method for detecting hijackers).
146. See T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 342.
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school setting.147  Accordingly, Vernonia represents a doctrinal failure
in that it subverts T.L.O.’s rationale, which included individualized sus-
picion in the school setting, without rationalizing why the school set-
ting presents a circumstance where individualized suspicion would be
impractical.148
In addition, Vernonia fails on the doctrinal principles of Skinner
and Von Raab, both of which found suspicionless drug testing policies
constitutional.  Those decisions, however, were predicated on two fun-
damental grounds:  (1) a serious drug problem that could (2) lead to a
disaster or a danger to public safety.  Under these constructs, the Court
applied the special needs doctrine and disposed of the need for indi-
vidualized suspicion.
In Skinner, there was evidence that the railroad industry had a sig-
nificant problem of “on-the-job intoxication and train accidents.”149
In addition, it was undisputed that the employees covered by the drug-
testing program were engaged in “safety sensitive tasks.”150  Accord-
ingly, the Court held that the employees had a lower expectation of
privacy by reason of their participation in an industry that is regulated
pervasively to ensure safety.151  The Court further held that the need
for drug testing without a showing of individualized suspicion was com-
pelling.152  “Employees subject to the tests discharge duties fraught
with such risks of injury to others that even a momentary lapse of atten-
tion can have disastrous consequences.”153  As a result, the Court held
that a requirement of suspicion in this context would significantly hin-
der the Government’s interest in promulgating regulations for the
safety of the public.154
Conversely, the Von Raab decision upheld a drug-testing program
for Customs Service officers even though there was no documented
drug abuse problem among the officers.155  Nevertheless, the Court
147. See id.; see also Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 678 (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (“nowhere
is it less clear that an individualized suspicion requirement would be ineffectual than in
the school context.  In most schools, the entire pool of [students] is under constant
supervision by teachers and administrators and coaches, be it in the classrooms, hall-
ways, or locker rooms.”).
148. Justice O’Connor, in Vernonia, argued that exceptions to the individualized
suspicion exception should be allowed “only where it has been clear that a suspicion-
based regime would be ineffectual.” See id. at 668.
149. See Skinner, 489 U.S. at 607.
150. See id. at 620.
151. See id. at 627.
152. See id. at 628.
153. See id.
154. See id. at 633.
155. See Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 674.
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found that these employees were in high-risk positions, carried fire-
arms, and had access to contraband, and could succumb to bribery by
drug smugglers.156  Therefore, Von Raab presented a “unique context”
where a demonstrated drug problem was not required and a suspi-
cionless search was more prudent.157
Notwithstanding Vernonia’s dependence on Skinner and Von
Raab,158 the backdrop of student drug testing schemes present note-
worthy distinctions.  First, school drug testing schemes lack demonstra-
ble evidence of a drug problem in the schools to warrant an invasion of
students Fourth Amendment rights.159  As discussed above, the Federal
Railroad Administration in Skinner had evidence of the significant
property damages and casualties that resulted from drug use by rail-
road employees.160  On the other hand, the public schools have
presented very little or no evidence of significant drug use problems in
the public schools.161
In Vernonia, the school district argued that there was an “immedi-
ate crisis” within its schools created by student athletes who were “lead-
ers of the drug culture.”162  According to the District Court:
[T]he administration was at its wits end and. . .a large seg-
ment of the student body, particularly those involved in
interscholastic athletics, was in a state of rebellion.  Disci-
plinary actions has reached ‘epidemic proportions.’  The
coincidence of an almost three-fold increase in classroom
disruptions and disciplinary reports along with the staff’s
direct observations of students using drugs or glamorizing
drug and alcohol use led the administration to the ines-
capable conclusion that the rebellion was being fueled by
alcohol and drug abuse as well as the student’s mispercep-
tions about the drug culture.163
156. See id.
157. See id.; see also Chandler, 520 U.S. at 307 (reaffirming the unique situation in
Von Raab).
158. See Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 658-664.
159. See supra Part III notes and accompanying text.
160. See Skinner, 489 U.S. at 607.
161. See Earls, 242 F.3d at 1272; see also University of Michigan Institute for Social
Research, Monitoring the Future Study (2001), available at http://www.monitoringthe
future.org/data/data.html (showing mixed findings across the country with increases
in student drug use of ecstasy and a decline with other kinds of drug use such as heroin,
LSD, crack and powdered cocaine.  The study also found a steady usage of marijuana
among school children.).
162. See Vernonia, 515 US at 649.
163. See id.;  see also 796 F. Supp. 1354, 1357 (Or. 1992).
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The Supreme Court agreed with the school district, holding that “a
special need beyond regular law enforcement existed to act aggres-
sively toward [the] students’ drug problem.”164  The increase in the
school district’s disciplinary problems, however, was a far cry from the
catastrophic circumstances present in Skinner, where there was not
only property damage but also human casualty.165  Moreover, in Skin-
ner there was quantifiable evidence that railroad workers were using
drugs and alcohol on the job.166  In Vernonia, the evidence of drug use
was not only scarce, but also described in a feathery manner that re-
flected disciplinary problems with the student body and not substantial
drug use.167  Indeed, Justice O’Connor criticized the justification for
the drug testing policy and noted the “great irony” of Vernonia’s suspi-
cionless drug testing policy was its basis on “first- or second-hand sto-
ries of. . .students.”168  Since Vernonia, some courts have gone even
further and not even required a showing of a demonstrable drug prob-
lem prior to drug testing a group of students.169
For example, in Earls, the District Court emphasized Vernonia’s
demonstrated drug problem in addition to holding that the special
needs exception “justif[ied] suspicionless drug testing. . . without first
finding a pervasive drug problem among the group to be tested.”170
The Tenth Circuit noted that “the evidence of drug use among [the
students tested was] far from the ‘epidemic’ and ‘immediate crisis’
164. See Amanda Bishop, Note, Students, Urinalysis & Extracurricular Activities: How
Vernonia’s Aftermath is Trampling Fourth Amendment Rights, 10 HEALTH MATRIX 217, 221
(2000).
165. See supra note 47 and accompanying text.
166. See id.
167. See Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 649.
168. Justice O’Connor recounts the evidence of drug use as follows:
Small groups of students. . .were observed by a teacher “passing joints back
and forth” across the street at a restaurant before school and during school
hours.  Another group was caught skipping school and using drugs at one
of the students’ houses.  Several students actually admitted their drug use to
school officials (some of them being caught with marijuana pipes).  One
student presented himself to his teacher as “clearly obviously inebriated”
and had to be sent home.  Still another was observed dancing and singing
at the top of his voice in the back of the classroom; when the teacher asked
what was going on, he replied, “Well, I’m just high on life.”  [O]n a certain
road trip, the school wrestling coach smelled marijuana smoke in a motel
room occupied by four wrestlers. See Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 679 (O’Connor,
J., dissenting) (citations omitted) (emphasis in original).
169. See Earls, 115 F. Supp. 2d 1281, 1285 (W.D. OK 2000).
170. See id.
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faced by the Vernonia schools.”171  Nonetheless, the Tenth Circuit pro-
ceeded to balance the privacy interests of the students against the
school district’s interest in testing students.172  Ultimately, the Su-
preme Court clarified its position and  proclaimed that a demon-
strated drug abuse problem is not always necessary to the validity of a
testing regime.173  If we are to accord students the Fourth Amendment
rights they are afforded under the Constitution we must have, at a min-
imum, cogent reasons for impinging on those rights.  In Chandler, the
Supreme Court, for the first time, clearly stated  circumstances in
which the special needs doctrine should apply.174  Interestingly, the
Supreme Court’s holding in Earls represents a different test from the
clarification given by Chandler, at least in the public school context.175
Another significant distinction between student drug testing poli-
cies and the holdings in Skinner and Von Raab is the absence of a seri-
ous safety risk.  While commentators have characterized the problems
of drugs and violence in the public schools as an incurable social ill,176
the situation in the public schools are not at the catastrophic level of
disaster that was observed in Skinner.177  Even in Von Raab, where the
issue was not based on catastrophe but the unique safety concerns that
Customs employees interdicting illegal drugs might be using drugs.178
As such, the school context presents distinct differences that should be
171. See Earls, 242 F.3d at 1272.  Indeed, there was no evidence showing a correla-
tion between students with disciplinary referrals, drugs use and extracurricular activi-
ties. See id. at 1273.
172. See id. at 1275.
173. See Earls, 122 S. Ct., at 2568. But see Bishop, supra note 164, at 244 (arguing
that the appropriate interpretation of Vernonia requires school districts to first show
that its drug problem is real and has risen to the level of an immediate crisis).
174. See supra notes 56-66 and accompanying text.
175. See Earls, 122 S. Ct. at 2568.  This is an example of how the Court’s attempt at
clarity has created a sea of confusion.  In Chandler, the Court noted that a demonstrated
drug problem was needed to “shore up” an assertion of special need for suspicionless
testing. See Chandler, 520 U.S. at 318.  Conversely, the Court has held that, in the school
context, the showing of a demonstrated drug problem is not always necessary to the
validity of a testing regime, even though some showing of a problem would “shore up”
an assertion of special need. See Earls, 122 S. Ct. at 2567-68. See Bradley, supra  note 8,
at 1468.  (“The fourth amendment is the Supreme Court’s tarbaby:  a mass of contradic-
tions and obscurities that has ensnared the ‘Brethren’ in such a way that every effort to
extract themselves only finds them more profoundly stuck.”)
176. See Timothy L. Jacobs, Comment, School Violence: An Incurable Social Ill That
Should Not Lead to the Unconstitutional Compromise of Students’ Rights, 38 DUQ. L. REV. 617
(2000).
177. See supra notes 46-47 and accompanying text.
178. See Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 674.
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reconciled in order to establish a sound constitutional foundation for
suspicionless drug testing policies.
In Vernonia, the Court emphasized the general danger of drug
abuse to students and the particular danger of “immediate physical
harm” to student athletes who were drug users.179  The Court noted
that “[a]part from psychological effects, which include impairment of
judgment, slow reaction time, and a lessening of the perception of
pain, the particular drugs screened by the District’s Policy have been
demonstrated to pose substantial physical risks to athletes.”180  How-
ever, using safety as a justification for testing students has proved prob-
lematic due to the over-inclusive and under-inclusive nature of the
testing policies, which tests certain segments of the student popula-
tion.181  As the Tenth Circuit observed, arguing the health care risk of
addiction or physical harm from the use of drugs would only permit
the testing of all students182 — an undesirable and unconstitutional
solution.
Indeed, there is legal scholarship, which advocates that school-
wide drug testing of all students is constitutionally plausible.183  Such
arguments find support in the tripartite test enunciated in Vernonia.184
One argument begins with Vernonia’s first prong, which evaluates pri-
vacy interests and proclaims that students have a diminished expecta-
tion of privacy generally while student athletes have an even lower
expectation of privacy.185  As discussed above, the Court’s rationale in
Vernonia was that the openness of student locker rooms resulted in
“communal undress,” which reduced such privacy expectations.186  As
such, potentially all students could be tested187 by the requirement in
179. See Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 554.
180. See id.
181. As the Tenth Circuit points out:  “[T]here are students involved in extracurric-
ular activities. . .who can hardly be considered a safety risk. . .On the other hand, there
are students who are not subject to the testing. . .who engage in activities. . .which
involve a measurable safety risk.” See Earls, 242 F.3d at 1277.
182. See id.
183. See Joanna Raby, Note, Reclaiming our Public Schools: A Proposal for School-Wide
Drug Testing, 21 CARDOZO L. REV. 999 (1999); See also, Anthony G. Buzbee, Note, Who
will Speak for the Teachers?  Precedent Prevails in Vernonia School District 47J v. Acton, 33
HOUS. L. REV. 1229 (1996); See also Blake W. Martell, Note, Hitting the Mark: Vernonia
School District v. Acton, 31 U.S.F. L. REV. 223 (1996).
184. See supra notes 90-102 and accompanying text.
185. See Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 657.
186. See id.
187. See Martell, supra note 183, at 255  (“The holding may also be viewed as open-
ing the door to permit other groups of students to be tested as well.”).
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many states that students take physical education classes188 further
demonstrating the skewed nature of Fourth Amendment jurispru-
dence in this area.  How has it come to this?  The answer lies in the
precarious substitution of the fact of individualized suspicion present
in T.L.O., by a watered-down showing of a demonstrable drug problem
in the public school setting.  As this Note demonstrates, Skinner and
T.L.O. are based on different theories under the Fourth Amendment
exception.  These theories have been amorphously combined in
Vernonia, and subsequently expanded by some courts to allow for test-
ing of a broader group of students.  The resulting analysis is a nonse-
quitor that has all but eradicated individualized suspicion and no
longer requires that drug use by the tested group is substantial, real or
even demonstrated.  Despite Chandler’s refinement on the quantum of
“special need” necessary to drug test,189 school districts are left with a
tripartite test that on its face seems balanced, but in reality operates as
a vehicle to disregard Fourth Amendment protections.190  Indeed, it
appears that the Chandler decision provided little clarification of the
special needs doctrine.191
As one commentator stated, “[t]he sanctity of individual dignity
has deteriorated from where the Court considered the search of a stu-
dent’s purse to constitute a ‘severe violation of subjective expectations
of privacy,’ to where a schoolchild being forced to urinate in front of
faculty implicated only ‘negligible’ privacy interest.”192  Therefore, a
more protective view of students’ Fourth Amendment rights must be
employed less students will have in practice, even if perhaps not in
theory, no rights at all.
If we accept the characterization of students’ rights as generally
diminished as compared to adult citizens,193 one should appreciate
that under this maxim students do have some rights.  As Tinker v. Des
188. See CAL. EDUC. CODE § 51222 (West 1989) (requiring 400 minutes of physical
education for every 10 school days); CONN. GEN. STAT.  § 10-16b (1996) (requiring
schools to provide physical education programs); MASS. GEN. LAWS  ch. 71, § 3 (1982)
(mandating physical education in all grades); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 18A:35-5 (West 1999)
(requiring physical education adapted to the ages and capabilities of the students); N.Y.
EDUC. LAW § 803 (McKinney 1988) (requiring physical education classes for students
over eight years old).
189. 520 U.S. at 319.
190. See Dery, supra note 106, at 102  (concluding that the Supreme Court’s balanc-
ing “has enabled the Court to reach conclusions unrestrained by the mandates of the
Fourth Amendment. The result has been a steady dilution of privacy rights”).
191. See supra note 183 and accompanying text.  See also Smiley, supra note 111, at
837 (arguing that the special needs doctrine has progress down a slippery slope.).
192. Dery, supra note 106, at 102.
193. Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 655.
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Moines Independent Community Sch. Dist. instructs, students do not “shed
their constitutional rights . . .at the schoolhouse gate.”194  Why is it
then that contemporary constitutional evaluation of drug testing poli-
cies provides for a complete diminution of Fourth Amendment rights?
Over the years, the Supreme Court’s evaluation of constitutional rights
in the public schools has been varied.  At best, the high Court’s juris-
prudence can be characterized of bipolar.195  In one extreme, namely
in cases involving students’ rights of expression,196 students’ Fourth
Amendment rights,197 and students’ due process rights,198 the Court
has adopted special constitutional standards for the school context.199
The other extreme, for example in Equal Protection Clause cases,200
the Court has not altered constitutional standards to take account of
the school context.201
Nonetheless, the common thread with these cases is that the stu-
dent retains some rights, however small.  For example, in the context
of students’ freedom of expression, the Court has curtailed their ability
to engage in certain forms of speech deemed lewd and offensive.202
However, students still retain the right to engage in silent protest, so
long as it does not “materially and substantially interfere with the re-
quirements of appropriate discipline in the operation of the
school.”203  As discussed above, suspicionless drug testing policies re-
present a substantial doctrinal failure because it would undermine the
fundamental safeguards that the special needs doctrine was developed
to serve.  The fundamental policies of the Fourth Amendment,204
which requires that searches be initiated with a warrant, or at least be
“reasonable,” should not be ignored in the school context.
V. CONCLUSION
For many years our nation has been plagued with the problem of
drug use in the public schools. As this Note points out, the Court’s
deviation from the warrant requirement to the “reasonableness” ap-
194. 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969).
195. See Ryan, supra  note 74, at 1345.
196. See Tinker, 393 U.S. at 506; Bethel Sch. Dist. v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675 (1986);
Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260 (1988).
197. See supra Part III.
198. See Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975).
199. See Ryan, supra  note 74, at 1345.
200. See Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
201. See Ryan, supra note 74, at 1345.
202. See Fraser, 478 U.S. at 687.
203. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 509.
204. See supra notes 7-12 and accompanying text.
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proach to Fourth Amendment interpretation has provided school dis-
tricts with a malleable solution devoid of individualized suspicion205
and a requirement that a substantial drug problem be present before
subjecting students to tests.  This framework is unclear, as seen by the
divergent outcomes throughout the United States, and more impor-
tantly deprives students of rights that were expressly provided to them
by our founding fathers.  This has occurred as result of the doctrinal
shift that the Court has taken, where two fundamental principles un-
derlying the special needs exception have been removed from the
analysis in the school context.
Garth Thomas
205. See Smiley, supra note 111, at 840-41 (arguing that the special needs doctrine
has failed and the Court should return to its pre-special needs jurisprudence and re-
adopt individualized suspicion).
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